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Preparing for the Bomb

The Development of Civil Defence
Policy in Canada, 1948-1963
Mark Davidson

D

uring the period 1949 to 1963 civil defence in
Canada developed in a number of stages that
reflected changes in technology, weaponry and
scientific discovery. The first stage of development,
roughly between 1949 and 1952, witnessed only
minor developments. Civil defence followed the
Second World War practice, with a focus on air
raid shelters and, if possible, evacuation. In the
years 1952 to 1954 as the possibility of a nuclear
attack became more real as a result of the Soviet
development of intercontinental bombers, civil
defence officials moved towards a policy of mass
evacuation of target areas and the rescue of
survivors. The detonation of a hydrogen bomb
and the discovery of radioactive fallout in 1954
led to yet another change in civil defence plans.
Civil defence officials became more convinced that
mass evacuation of target areas was the answer,
however, fallout shelters were also recommended
for those areas outside the target area likely to
be blanketed with radioactive debris. In the late
1950s and into the early 1960s civil defence again
had to be redefined as intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) were developed and evacuation
was no longer possible as nuclear attack could
occur virtually without warning.
Responsibility for civil defence was divided
amongst all three levels of government – federal,
provincial, and municipal. At the federal level,
responsibility for civil defence first fell under
the Department of National Defence and
Minister Brooke Claxton. The development
of civil defence policy was the responsibility
of Federal Civil Defence Coordinator, MajorGeneral F.F. Worthington,1 who oversaw most
civil defence issues at the federal level. In 1951
responsibility was transferred to the Department
of National Health and Welfare, and its minister,

Paul Martin. In 1959, responsibility for civil
defence was again reallocated, this time to three
departments: the Department of National Defence,
a committee within the Privy Council called the
Emergency Measures Organization (EMO), and
the Department of National Health and Welfare.
This lasted until the mid-1960s when the Lester
B. Pearson government transferred responsibility
for civil defence to the Department of Defence
Production.2
The organization of civil defence at the
provincial level reflected that of the federal
government. In Ontario, responsibility for civil
defence fell to a newly-formed civil defence
committee which was made up of the deputy
cabinet ministers, a civil defence coordinator,
and emergency officials such as the Ontario
Fire Marshal and the Ontario Provincial Police
Commissioner. Following the transfer of civil
defence to the federal Emergency Measures
Organization (EMO), a provincial EMO was also
formed, but membership remained virtually
unchanged from the structure of the Civil Defence
Committee.3
Civil defence organization at the municipal
level varied greatly. A general structure, set out
in an Ontario government document, called
for the appointment of a Civil Defence Control
Committee to be composed of the following: the
mayor, a quorum of municipal council, and a
selection of prominent citizens from industry,
the clergy, the press, the Canadian Legion,
service groups, the Red Cross, and St. John’s
Ambulance.4
On 23 September 1949 the President of the
United States, Harry S. Truman, announced that
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Major-General F.F. Worthington was appointed Federal
Civil Defence Coordinator in 1948. Previous to that he had
had a distinguished career in the Canadian military during
the First and Second World Wars, and was regarded as a
Canadian pioneer in tank warfare.

the Soviet Union had successfully completed an
atomic test.5 Following Truman’s announcement,
press reports focused on the Soviet Union’s
technological achievement, and questions as to
how the Soviet Union managed to complete a
nuclear weapon much earlier than expected, only
four years after the United States. Editorials in
the Globe & Mail and Montreal Gazette stressed
that the Soviet atomic test posed little threat to
the western world, and that “nothing more has
happened than what was bound to happen.”6 In
the month following the Soviet atomic test there
were no press accounts on the need for civilian
defence in the Globe & Mail or the Montreal
Gazette.
In fact, civil defence planning had started in
Canada, but only recently and on a small scale.
In 1948 Major-General F.F. Worthington was
appointed Federal Civil Defence Coordinator
and he spent much of his first year on the

job studying civil defence in various countries
around the world, attending civil defence training
in Britain and surveying existing civil defence
preparations across Canada.7 In 1949 some
civil defence measures began to be developed
and implemented. One of the first nation-wide
measures was an effort to standardize fire
equipment, so that hoses from undamaged or
lightly damaged centres could be connected to
hydrants in heavily damaged centres.8 Other
measures taken at this time included plans for
an attack warning system, mass evacuation,
designs for shelters and arrangements for the
care of casualties.9
Federal civil defence authorities identified
cities that would be likely targets because of
their importance as government or economic
centres. These included Halifax, Québec City,
Montréal, Ottawa-Hull, Toronto, Sault Ste.
Marie, Sarnia, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Calgary
and Vancouver. The list would be revised and
amended many times in the years to come as
cities changed in importance.10 In these cities
civil defence preparations would be especially
important. In this early stage of civil defence
planning the responsibilities of the various levels
of government were also decided upon by the
federal government as follows:
Federal: To assess and keep under continuous
review the forms and scales of attack to be
anticipated in the event of war and to initiate
and guide planning of appropriate civil defence
measures; to organize federal services for civil
defence; to coordinate plans and activities of the
provinces and municipalities.
Provincial: To prepare regional plans and
responsible for preparatory and other measures
within their area; to coordinate activities of
municipalities, to organize provincial services
for civil defence.
Municipal: To be responsible for local planning
and for organizing municipal services for civil
defence; to be responsible for coordinating
all services and implementing all civil defence
measures in the municipal area.11

As this document suggests, although civil defence
policy was formulated for the most part at the

30
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Civil defence preparations would continue in
1950 with renewed public interest as international
events such as the victory of the Communist forces
in China’s civil war in 1949 and the outbreak of
the Korean War in June 1950 raised the public
perception that a third world war might break
out in the near future.12
In August 1950 representatives of the federal
and provincial governments met in Ottawa for a
Dominion-Provincial conference on civil defence.
In his opening statement, Minister of National
Defence Brooke Claxton informed those gathered
of the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union
and of the proposed measures to protect civilians.
Claxton informed the delegates that the Russians
were in possession of “aircraft of the B-29 type
capable of delivering atomic or conventional
bombs” to North America. 13 In addition to
describing the nature of the threat, the DominionProvincial conference also provided many specific
details as to what form civil defence was to take.
The conference recommended the protection of
Canada’s vital points, which it defined as those
establishments, industrial or administrative,
“essential to the prosecution of a war or to the
maintenance of basic economic life and for which
there is no satisfactory alternative.” These vital
points were to be assessed by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) and to receive adequate
protection. This included measures to prevent
sabotage, such as the installation of fencing, and
the stationing of guards.14

and immediate aid to distressed people. These
areas were to be strong in the rescue, pioneer,
welfare, and ambulance elements of civil defence.
Finally the “reception area” was to provide refuge,
shelter, and aid to refugees who could not be
accommodated in the “cushion area.” Most of
the smaller cities and rural areas in Canada
would be designated reception areas.16 It is
interesting to note that this document was not
advocating evacuation of the target areas prior
to an attack; rather it anticipated that survivors
of an attack would exit the area afterwards. Civil
defence officials anticipated that survival would
be possible in shelters of the type used in Britain
during the Second World War.17 But unlike the
experience of Britain in the Second World War
little effort was made in these years to construct
large public shelters of the type used in London
during the war. Some did suggest that the Toronto
subway stations then under construction could
be used as shelters, but such action was not
taken.18

Canadian War Museum 20040030-1

federal and provincial levels, plans as to how civil
defence was to be carried out on the ground and
implementation of those plans were a municipal
responsibility.

The Dominion-Provincial Conference report
also recommended that the country be divided
into three types of areas – “target areas,”
“cushion areas,” and “reception areas” – each
with its own role in the event of enemy attack.
The report argued that these target areas
should be organized immediately for civil
defence in order to minimize the effects of an
attack. In addition to fire and police personnel,
target areas were to have a headquarters with
communications and reconnaissance wings
and five main units: wardens, rescue, pioneer,
welfare, and ambulance.15 The “cushion area”
which surrounded the target area should be of
sufficient size to provide aid to the stricken city
31
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On 23 February 1951, the second DominionProvincial Conference on Civil Defence was
held in Ottawa. Claxton closed his remarks
with several recommendations including that
civil defence organization be completed at the
provincial and municipal levels, that training of
civil defence personnel continue, that a campaign
of public information be started, and that the
provision of warning devices and specialized civil
defence equipment be carried out. Finally Claxton
announced that civil defence was, for the most
part, not a federal responsibility and therefore
should not be the responsibility of National
Defence; civil defence would be transferred to the
Department of National Health and Welfare under

Shortly after receiving responsibility for civil
defence the Department of National Health and
Welfare released an instructional booklet entitled
Personal Protection Under Atomic Attack. The
booklet advised building shelters in cellars or
backyards and compared building a shelter
to other normal precautions such as “putting
a lightning rod on the roof or anti-freeze in a
car.”23 The blast and initial heat effects of the
atomic bomb were viewed as the greatest threat.
Therefore, the booklet advised citizens to get rid
of fire hazards, cover windows with plywood,
and have pails of water or sand at hand to fight
fires. The third effect of the bomb, radiation, was
dismissed by the booklet: there was no reason
to become “panicky” about radioactivity as like
an x-ray the radioactivity in a nuclear attack
would last for only about a minute and any
lingering radioactive particles would be scattered
over so many miles that they would no longer
be dangerous.24 As this booklet demonstrates,
during this period citizens were expected to take
shelter within their own homes; government
literature did not recommend evacuation and
often downplayed the effects of a nuclear attack.
The atomic bomb was represented to the public
as being just another way of causing an explosion,
just one more powerful than a conventional
weapon.25

Iarocci

In addition to organization at the federal
and provincial levels, some municipalities
also began to organize in 1950. In Toronto,
the municipal council in conjunction with the
County of York decided to establish a civil defence
committee which was immediately to begin
registering volunteers for the various divisions
of civil defence. An initial budget of $2,000 was
established for the group. However, it was noted
by the city council that the municipality had
not yet received enough information from the
province to proceed, so initially only a skeleton
organization was organized.20

Paul Martin.21 Civil defence was considered to
be primarily a local responsibility because to
be effective civil defence plans would have to be
adapted to local circumstances and carried out
by the local authorities. The suggestion that civil
defence be transferred to another department
was not a new one. In the House of Commons
opposition members had been suggesting for
several weeks that the defence minister was
carrying a great burden and that civil defence as
a civilian activity be transferred from National
Defence to another department.22
Andrew

Nevertheless, pre-attack evacuation was not
completely ruled out. A three-stage evacuation
process was recommended if it were deemed
possible. In the first stage those non-essential to
the war effort – children up to age 12, expectant
mothers, and aged people, for example, would
be evacuated. Second, those essential to the
war effort, but not required in the immediately
vulnerable area, were to be evacuated. Finally
key citizens who had to remain close to their
jobs in a key industry or utility or administrative
unit would be evacuated.19 Civil defence officials
were reluctant to recommend mass evacuation
of target areas for fear of the effect evacuating
workers would have on the economy and on
the production of essential war materials. In
addition, plans at this stage were still based on
the effects of the “standard,” or Hiroshima-sized,
A-bomb (roughly 20,000 kilotons or the effect of
20,000 tons of TNT). Therefore it was felt that
methods similar to those used in the Second
World War, such as air raid shelters including
improvised facilities like subway stations, would
provide adequate protection.

The years 1954 to 1957 would mark a major
transition in civil defence planning. The advent
of the much more powerful H-bomb and the
discovery of radioactive fallout would lead to a
focus on mass evacuation as the only means of
survival for those within target areas. Warnings
about the destructive power of the hydrogen
bomb had been discussed in the press for years.
Articles predicted that the hydrogen bomb would
give a significant political advantage to whichever
superpower was the first to produce such a

32
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weapon and in the years prior to the first H-bomb
explosion there were many articles that expressed
fear that the Soviet Union had already discovered the
technology.26

Andrew
Iarocci
on
Collecti

In early 1954 the United States began tests of
hydrogen bombs on the Bikini Atoll in the South
Pacific, the results of which were shocking.27 Beyond
the enormity of the explosions themselves the
real surprise was the distance that concentrated
amounts of radioactive debris (fallout) from the
explosion travelled from the site of detonation.
The “phenomenon of ‘fallout’” was the primary
focus of a report issued by the US Atomic Energy
Commission in February of 1955 on the tests.28
The report stated that fallout from the March
1954 thermonuclear bomb test at the Bikini
Atoll was deposited in varying amounts that
contaminated an elliptical area that extended
220 miles downwind and varied in width up

33
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current stock pile had been planned for a 20
kiloton bomb), and if shelters could be used.31 In
a speech to the Corps of Imperial Frontiersmen
in June of 1954, Major-General Matthew Penhale,
Commandant of Canada’s Civil Defence College
at Arnprior, Ontario,32 noted that the destructive
power of the H-bomb increased the possible zone
of destruction from three to seven miles up to 10
to 15 miles. Such a bomb, Penhale noted, would
leave no portion of any Canadian city without
damage.33 Therefore taking shelter within a target
city or evacuating the population to the immediate
outskirts of a city would no longer be effective.

to 40 miles. The report went on to estimate the
effect this widespread fallout would have on a
populated area. Assuming that people had taken
no precautions, had remained outdoors without
shelter, and had been exposed for 36 hours and
therefore received a maximum dose, there was
“sufficient radioactivity in a down-wind belt
about 140 miles in length and of varying width
up to 20 miles to have seriously threatened the
lives of nearly all persons in the area who did
not take protective measures.”29 This discovery
would change civil defence plans not only in
designated target areas but also in communities
downwind from potential targets. Of course
fallout had always resulted from previous A-bomb
explosions, but the H-bomb tests revealed just
how widespread and deadly fallout could be.

Canadian War Museum 20040030-3

In a speech reprinted in the Civil Defence
Bulletin for June 1954, Paul Martin put forth
three considerations for any future plans. First,
early warning of an approaching attack had
become increasingly important. Second, the
days of local, and self sufficient, civil defence
organizations were over now that the possible
area of destruction had become so large. Third,
the H-bomb did not eliminate the possibility of
an attack by other means.34 A similar message
was touted by the civil defence coordinator for
the Metropolitan Region of Montreal, Lieutenant-

When asked in the House of Commons how
the test of a hydrogen bomb and the discovery
of radioactive fallout would affect Canada’s civil
defence, Paul Martin responded that they would
need to be re-examined.30 On 28 April 1954
Paul Martin asked the civil defence committee to
determine if population dispersal was a possibility,
if medical stockpiles should be increased (as the
34
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Colonel W.A. Croteau, who in an interview for the
Montreal Gazette stressed the importance of early
warning, and urged traffic engineers to examine
the possibility of planning for evacuation.35
At the local level in 1954, there was also
some progress. Attempting to quiet complaints
that too heavy a burden had been placed on
municipalities in the federal government’s
civil defence plan, Paul Martin announced the
intention to share the expense of civil defence
among the three levels of government. The plan
called for the federal government to assume 50
percent of the cost of all approved civil defence
projects with the provincial and municipal
governments each paying 25 percent of the
cost. This was a significant change as prior to
this reform municipalities, with the aid of the
provincial government in some cases, were
responsible for providing the entire civil defence
budget save for programs such as fire equipment
standardization where each level of government
paid one-third of the costs. Responding to this
plan Conservative opposition leader George Drew
noted that many provinces (most notably Ontario
and Quebec) had not agreed to the formula, and
that therefore municipalities would still be left
on their own to fund civil defence projects.36
As civil defence plans shifted away from air
raid shelters toward a policy of mass evacuation
in 1954 and 1955 much attention became focused
on how to make evacuation of Canada’s largest
cities possible. On 2 February 1956 Federal
Civil Defence Coordinator F.F. Worthington sent
a copy of a provisional civil defence plan to all
Provincial Coordinators. The plan called for
mass evacuation of 12 target areas.37 Evacuation
was to take place in four phases. Phase A called
for the evacuation of non-essential civilians
when intelligence and a deteriorating world
situation indicated that an attack was about to
be launched. Phase B called for the withdrawal
of the remaining population as the enemy
approached Canada. Phases C and D called for
the return to the city of emergency workers and
for civil defence workers to search for survivors,
provide aid, and begin rehabilitation. The plan
assumed that in any future war nuclear weapons
would be used against North America from the
beginning. Furthermore it was believed that the
first few days of a nuclear war would be the
worst. Finally it was assumed that Canada would
receive a minimum of three hours notice of an
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approaching attack from the radar lines in the
north, which would provide adequate time for
the evacuation of cities. However the plan noted
that many Canadian cities would not be hit in
the first wave of attacks as most of the primary
targets were in the United States; this too would
provide more time for evacuation.38
On 27 July 1956 Paul Martin announced that
evacuation was official civil defence policy in the
House of Commons during the debate on the
estimates. “Our Civil Defence policy,” he stated,
“should now be based on the development and
testing of plans for the orderly evacuation on
short notice of the main urban areas in Canada
should the possibility of attack on such areas by
nuclear weapons appear to be imminent.” To this
end Martin requested a civil defence budget of
$7,010,018 or approximately 43 cents per capita.
The majority of the federal civil defence budget,
about 34 percent, would be spent on the medical
stockpiling program, with 29 percent going to the
provinces and municipalities and 10 percent to
the civil defence college at Arnprior.39
The announcement of a new federal civil
defence policy was a long time coming, but
only a few months later there were signs that
it would soon be obsolete. By April 1956 both
superpowers had begun to experiment with shortrange ballistic missiles. Although a perfected
design and mass production of missiles were still
sometime in the future, it was a sign that civil
defence plans would soon need to be revised.40
Throughout the early part of 1957 mass
evacuation remained the principle means of
civil defence. Metropolitan Toronto City Council
minutes reveal that much of the discussion
of civil defence in that area focused on the
35
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construction and improvement of highways to
make evacuation of the city possible. In January
1957 Metro Council requested that the provincial
and federal governments become involved in
the construction of the Don Valley Parkway
and the Lakeshore Expressway as part of their
contribution to civil defence.41 This request for
assistance was rejected in March 1957 by the
Department of Public Works, which argued that
while the project contributed to civil defence it
was a provincial and municipal responsibility to
construct such highways.42
Nuclear attack by ICBMs became all the
more probable when the Soviet Union launched
the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, on 4 October
1957. Early newspaper reports focused on the
scientific achievement Sputnik represented,43
yet it was hard to miss the fact that the rocket
that launched a peaceful satellite orbiting the
earth could become a guided missile with a
hydrogen bomb warhead. The development of
ICBMs held major implications for civil defence
planning. Mass evacuation was based on the
assumption that an enemy attack would involve
manned bombers, and Canadian cities would
receive a minimum of three hours’ warning from
the radar lines of an impending attack. ICBMs
would shorten the warning period considerably
and increase the possibility of a surprise attack
in which no warning would be received.
In 1958 the recently-elected Diefenbaker
government appointed the retiring Chief of
the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Howard
Graham, to conduct a review of civil defence
policy and recommend changes which should
be undertaken in response to the development of
ICBMs.44 At this same time greater responsibility
was taken on by the federal government, which
assigned the militia some duties previously
assigned to civil defence volunteers and local
organizations. In the House of Commons
Diefenbaker’s Minister of National Defence, G.
R. Pearkes, explained that some militia units
would be organized into approximately 50
mobile columns consisting of reconnaissance
companies, rescue companies, and traffic control
units designed to help implement civil defence
measures in the event of enemy attack.45 Pearkes
went on to stress that “the appearance of an
organized, disciplined, uniformed body would
do more to restore morale than almost anything

else.”46 This comment suggests that Pearkes may
have felt that the current volunteer civil defence
organization was not up to the task and would
not be able to restore morale, a message which
the former minister in charge of civil defence,
Paul Martin, stated had upset many people in
Canada who felt that adequate civil defence could
be provided without the military.47
The Diefenbaker government became focused
on preserving civilian government in Canada, a
new aspect of civil defence which would become
known as continuity of government. As early as
1957 documents were circulated by federal civil
defence authorities that stressed the importance
of having an operational civilian government to
respond to the crisis following a nuclear attack
in order to co-ordinate the distribution of food,
fuel, and other essential supplies, maintain law
and order, allocate manpower, conduct foreign
relations regarding the war, and manage public
finances. A 1957 document considered three
courses of action. The first was to provide
protection for the government within the capital.
This approach it was argued would require
maximum protection and would therefore
be prohibitively expensive. A second option
involved relocating each unit of government
outside the probable target area. The third and
recommended option was to provide a re-located
seat of the federal government outside Ottawa,
with a number of federal/provincial regions
and federal/provincial sub-regions across the
country. This would allow for the government
to function independently in each region until
communication facilities and other basic services
were restored.48 As early as 1957 civil defence
officials were preparing to build shelters to
ensure the survival of key government officials
in various locations across the country.
Graham handed his report to the Diefenbaker
government in early 1959. The report was kept
confidential and therefore not discussed in
parliament or in the press.49 Some of Graham’s
recommendations were later published in his
memoirs. He advised that a close relationship
between civil defence and the military should
exist. Furthermore Graham noted that an attack
was unlikely, but suggested that once hostilities
commenced the warning period would be short,
possibly a matter of minutes. He also concluded
that the mass evacuation of cities was not only

36

Davidson - Civil Defence.indd 36

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss3/4

08/08/2007 5:23:58 PM

8

Davidson: Preparing for the Bomb

impractical, but also unacceptable to the public.
Finally Graham recommended that the federal
government should assume sole responsibility
for civil defence.50 Graham’s recommendations
for improving civil defence in Canada were
obviously aimed at complaints that Canadians
were uninterested in civil defence, that plans
were unrealistic, and that municipalities were
ill-equipped to bear the cost of civil defence.

In the years that immediately followed
the 1959 changes in civil defence policy,
developments focused on two main areas – the
implementation of the home shelter policy and
the protection for continuity of government. The
effort to encourage individuals to construct home
fallout shelters was met for the most part with
frustration. Although the government published
booklets such as 11 Steps to Survival (1961) and
Your Basement Fallout Shelter (1961), which

i Collection

Andrew Iarocc

Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced a new
civil defence policy in the House of Commons
on 23 March 1959. The federal government
did assume some responsibilities which were
previously assigned to the provinces and
municipalities, but responsibility for civil defence
was not placed solely under National Defence as
Graham had recommended. The military was
assigned a number of the technical civil defence
functions, for example sounding warning signals,
and tracking fallout. Humanitarian tasks such as
providing for the sick, injured, and displaced, and
providing emergency accommodation remained
the responsibility of the Department of National
Health and Welfare as well as the provinces and
municipalities. Finally the Emergency Measures
Organization (EMO), a division within the Privy
Council Office and thus the responsibility of the
Prime Minister, was to assume a coordinating
role between the various departments and
carry out responsibilities not assigned to other
departments.51 The federal government also
assumed a greater portion of the financial
responsibility for civil defence – fully threequarters – leaving the provincial governments to
pay 15 percent and the municipal governments
to pay ten percent.52 This new funding formula
prompted those provinces and municipalities
which had previously refused to fund or cancelled
their civil defence programs to allocate funds.53

shielding individuals from fallout.55 In the months
ahead many different ideas as to what form
shelter construction should take would emerge,
but ultimately the government and the civil
defence organization would promote basement
fallout shelters which could be constructed by
individuals in their home basements for a cost
of about $500.56

Diefenbaker’s announcement did leave a
major aspect of civil defence policy undefined.
As Paul Martin pointed out, the prime minister’s
announcement did not specify whether or not
evacuation was still the principle means of civil
defence.54 The government would not have an
answer to this question until July 1959 when
Minister of National Health and Welfare J.W.
Monteith announced that studies conducted
by the Rand Corporation and the US Congress
suggested that the best means of protection from
ICBMs would be to construct shelters capable of
37
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These are the fold-out plans contained in the pamphlet, Your Basement Fallout Shelter.

encouraged shelter construction and provided
instructions as to how to construct a shelter, the
number of individuals who chose to build home
shelters was disappointing.
As well the government did undertake
shelter construction to ensure the continuity
of government. The Diefenbaker government
authorized the construction of an emergency
regional site in each province from which federal,
provincial and military personnel could operate
during a nuclear war, independently if need
be, to coordinate the war effort and survival
operations.57 Known as BRIDGE Installations,

each of these 58 fallout shelters of varying sizes
were constructed outside the provincial capitals,
Ottawa58 and various regional headquarters,
and were to house a mix of essential provincial,
federal, and military personnel. The shelters
were to offer protection from fallout, though
not blast damage, construction costs were paid
by the federal government, and each location
was to be linked to the others by an emergency
communication system. 59 Prime Minister
Diefenbaker was not to be evacuated to the so
called “Diefenbunker,” the Federal government’s
emergency site outside Ottawa. Instead as
Diefenbaker explained to parliament, a shelter

38
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exactly like the shelters ordinary Canadians
were advised to build in their own homes was
constructed at his official residence, 24 Sussex
Drive. As Diefenbaker exclaimed, “that is where
I shall be when and if war should come.”60
During the years 1948 to 1963 Canada’s
Civil Defence policy was continuously revised
and adapted to changes in technology, weaponry,
scientific discovery and world politics. In the
years after 1963 civil defence policy would remain
much the same and it would be the organization
itself which would have to change in order to
remain viable in the face of a growing public
perception that civil defence efforts were futile
and unnecessary. Although many civil defence
measures such as the BRIDGE shelters would
remain in use, in some cases into the 1990s, an
increased willingness on the part of US and USSR
to use negotiation to avoid nuclear war led civil
defence organizations to redefine themselves.61
Historian Costia Nikitiuk documents this
change within civil defence organizations using
the example of the British Columbia civil defence
organization. He argues that British Columbia’s
civil defence organization evolved over time
from an organization originally intended to deal
with the emergency situation of nuclear war in
the early 1950s into an organization designed
to handle everyday emergencies such as forest
fires, floods, and earthquakes by the late 1960s
and early 1970s.62 Nititiuk argues that these
changes occurred as “the public lost confidence
in the ability of civil defence organizations to
make realistic preparations for war.”63 In fact,
from the outset civil defence organizations were
designed to be “dual-use” organizations focused
on planning for nuclear war, but able to respond
to more everyday emergencies such as floods,
fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters.
As early as 1950 MPs in the House of Commons
suggested that Canada’s civil defence organization
should be set up in such a way that it would be
not only be useful in the event of nuclear war, but
also for natural disasters.64
The study of Canada’s civil defence
preparations adds much to our understanding
of Canada’s participation in the Cold War.
Canada’s involvement in the Cold War is most
often compared to the experience in the United
States. In this respect Canada is often said to have

been more calm, deliberate, and at times more
rational.65 Nevertheless it is widely recognized
in the historiography that in many respects the
Cold War was largely a psychological war which
created a culture of fear which permeated every
aspect of Canadian society.66 It is in this respect
that civil defence has been an overlooked aspect
of Canada’s Cold War history. As this study
has demonstrated, Canadians were concerned
about the possibility of nuclear war and many
precautions were implemented to aid the survival
of the population. Millions of dollars were spent
on infrastructure and programs intended to
protect and educate Canadians in preparation for
nuclear war. In this way civil defence provided a
means through which Canadians could cope with
the psychological aspects of the Cold War.
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